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 I.  Introduction
 
 In the last two decades the New Zealand economy has been subject to an extremely
extensive and far-reaching episode of liberalisation.  Reforms have included institutional
changes to the central bank, the way in which government departments organise and report
their affairs, reforms of labour, capital and goods markets and even electoral reform.
Amongst these reforms have been extensive liberalisations of New Zealand’s international
trading regime.
 A central distinguishing characteristic of these reforms is that they have been largely
unilateral. The aim of this paper is to consider the political forces behind these trade
reforms with an eye towards explaining the political success of the unilateral approach.
We seek to provide some answers to the following sorts of question.  What were the vested
interests behind New Zealand’s starting point of very high protection and how did they
succeed in getting it implemented?  Why were reforms mooted – what happened such that
the early status quo was no longer politically feasible?  Why did the trade reforms succeed
(in the sense of being put in place) and how did that implementation occur so as to
overcome these special interests?  Why unilateralism?  Why has liberalisation not been
complete (especially as it has been so dramatic: one might think that the final steps would
be easier in some sense)?  How important were multilateral and bilateral deals in affecting
New Zealand’s unilateral reforms?  How, if at all, has New Zealand’s multilateral position
been affected by these reforms?
 In considering these questions we look not only at the evolution of trade policy in New
Zealand in recent decades but also focus on two important sectoral groups: manufacturing
and agriculture.  We discuss the involvement of these groups in the reform process and the
ex post consequences for them of the reforms. Our approach to the political economy of
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unilateralism is organised around Bhagwati’s 1988 framework of Ideas, Institutions and
Interests.  Finally, in order to get some idea of the political strength of various groups in
New Zealand as reflected in trade policy, we use the methodology of Anderson (1996) to
estimate effective rates of protection from a 22 sector CGE model of the New Zealand
economy.
 While our focus is on trying to understand direct trade reforms, many aspects of the
entire reform process have had consequences for New Zealand’s trading position.
Accordingly, we shall start by outlining the major economic reforms that have occurred
since the early 80’s.
 
 
 II.  The facts of the New Zealand experience
 
 A.  A timeline of economic reforms
 New Zealand (NZ) is a country about the size of Great Britain but with a population of
only 3.5m or so.  In 1995, GDP was a little under US$60b1 (so per capita GDP was a little
under US$17,000) and around 12% of this was generated in primary production, 20% in
manufacturing and 60% in services.  Exports amounted to 31% of GDP and raw and
processed pastoral and wood products accounted for 70% of total merchandise exports
(machinery, motor vehicles and mineral fuels accounted for almost 45% of total
merchandise imports.)  In sum, NZ is a small, open economy exporting mainly primary
and processed primary products.
                                                
1 The following data are taken from Evans et al: henceforth EGWT.
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 For a large part of its history since British settlement, NZ had relied on Great Britain as
a destination for its agricultural exports.  This was the source of NZ’s very high standard of
living: in the early 50’s NZ had one of the 5 highest per capita incomes in the world.  The
relative decline of the NZ economy in the last 30 years has frequently been pinned on
external factors such as the severity with which the oil shocks of the 70’s hit the country
and the accession of the U.K. to the EEC in 1973.  However, EGWT note that NZ
developed a comprehensive (and expensive) system of social legislation and became an
increasingly regulated and publicly-owned economy.2  They suggest that the focus on
external factors as the source of NZ’s woes caused policy-makers to overlook the need for
greater internal flexibility so that by the late 70’s/ early 80’s NZ had extensive import
controls, state ownership of assets, price and wage controls (including exchange rate and
foreign ownership controls) and high debt.
 In 1984 an election was called, triggering massive flight out of the NZ dollar3; so much
so that the Reserve Bank ceased to convert NZ$ to foreign currency the day after the
election leading to a constitutional crisis, “until the outgoing prime minister agreed to
implement the instructions of the incoming government” (EGWT, p.5.)  It was with the
FX and constitutional crises as background that NZ’s new Labour government launched its
reform programme.  Table 1 (adapted from EGWT Fig 2)  presents the major components
of the reforms.
 (Table 1 here)
                                                
2  Public largesse was a feature of all governments, regardless of political persuasion.  After the 1972 election
in which Labour ousted the previous National government, the outgoing National finance minister announced
that Labour would be unable to keep its spending promises as, “I’ve spent the lot.”  As it turns out, this did not
constrain Labour’s behaviour anyway.
3 Indeed, the government lost such quantities of reserves that it resorted to raiding the FX holdings of its
overseas embassies.
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 B.  Economic performance since the reforms
 
 The performance of the NZ economy since the reforms were initiated has been well
documented4 so we will just summarise things very briefly here.  After very high growth in
1984, NZ experienced real GDP growth of less than 2% in every year from 1985 to 1992
(including a fall of over 1% in 1991.)  However, growth has picked up substantially to
exceed 3.5% p.a. since 1993.  Inflation has fallen dramatically from over 17% in 1986 to
around 2% p.a. from 1991 to the present.  Unemployment, historically very low in NZ, hit
a high of nearly 11% in 1991 and now hovers at around 6% of the workforce while
employment has risen about 15% since 1993.  The government has operated a fiscal
surplus since 1993 and used it, in large part, to retire public foreign debt.  Gross
government debt in 1991 was 60.5% of GDP, in 1995 it was only 50.9%.5  Government
overseas debt in 1993 was 35% of GDP, in 1996 it is 25%.
  Based on casual observation, it seems that New Zealanders are still quite split about
the effectiveness and desirability of reforms since 1980.  Interestingly, however, the
governments responsible for the major reforms (the Labour government of 1984 and the
National government of 1990) were both subsequently re-elected (in 1987 and 1993
respectively) the former with an increased majority.  One of the primary architects of the
Labour government’s reforms, Roger Douglas, fell out with the Prime Minister in 1987
and was sacked in 1988.  (In an interesting parallel, the Finance Minister in charge during
many of the subsequent reforms under the 1990 National government, Ruth Richardson,
                                                
4 See, e.g., EGWT, Bollard et al (1996) and OECD (1996).
5 OECD (1996).
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was also sacked the year after the National government was re-elected in 1993.)  It is
frequently suggested that voter anger at the reforms was stimulated by the perception that
the Labour government was hijacked by a small cabal of reformers who had kept their
intentions hidden until they were in power.6  Not only does the re-election of the Labour
government in 1987 cast considerable doubt on this version of events7 but Roger Douglas
had himself, “advocated the case for radical reform some years earlier in a book…”
(EGWT p.7).  Furthermore, there had been academic opinion for many years that the NZ
economy was over-regulated, particularly in the area of trade policy and many public
officials, notably in Treasury, were well-versed in recent developments in microeconomic
theory and had been drawing on this knowledge to develop alternative policy proposals.
 
 
 C.  The evolution of trade policy in New Zealand
 1. An overview8
 Any attempt to quantify the evolution of New Zealand’s trade policy over the last 40 or 50
years is complicated by the extensive use of quantitative restrictions and (largely as a
consequence of this) the wide disparity in levels of protection across sectors.  What studies
there have been of restrictions through the 1970s tend to be of selected industries only.  So
                                                
6 Jane Kelsey, an outspoken critic of the reforms, in describing the process of the reforms entitles the second
chapter of her 1995 book “Capturing the political machine”.  Wallis (1997) also makes plain this interpretation
even in his title: "Policy conspiracies and economic reform programs in advanced industrial democracies: the
case of New Zealand."
7 Another common argument is that electoral reforms - the introduction of a system of proportional
representation for the 1996 election - were also triggered by this sense of capture of the policy-making process
by unrepresentative interests.
8  The material in this section draws heavily on Lattimore and Wooding (1996).
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one study suggests that in the late 1950’s the effective rate of protection of auto assembly
was in excess of 2,400% and that for clothing was over 120%.9  A more recent and
frequently cited study of effective rates in 1982 found rates of 90% in textiles and over
50% in a number of other manufacturing industries.10  The wide disparity in rates across
sectors makes many indicators of “openness” quite misleading for New Zealand.  So even
in 1994, for example, while tariff revenues as a percentage of the total value of imports
were only 3.4% in NZ, about the same as the OECD wide average, the average duty paid
on dutiable lines was around 27%.11
 Nevertheless, the general consensus on NZ trade policy through to the early 1980s can
be summed up thus: “[u]p to 1984, New Zealand had probably the highest tariffs on
manufactured goods of any OECD country, and was the only developed country to
maintain a comprehensive system of quantitative controls”.12
 This contrasts with the following comment from the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative in 1997: “New Zealand’s open trade and investment policy continues to be
a bellwether for regional and global trade and investment liberalization” (USTR (1997
p.267).)  Likewise, the WTO comments, “New Zealand has transformed its economy from
among the most heavily protected and regulated into one of the most market-oriented and
open in the world.”13  In 1996 the average applied tariff on all dutiable lines in NZ was
                                                
9   See Rayner and Lattimore (1991 p.66.)
10   Syntec, cited in Lattimore and Wooding (1996 p.335).
11   Ministry of Commerce (1994 p. 134).
12   OECD (1989 p.39).
13   WTO (1996).  While the starting point for NZ in 1984 was a highly regulated economy, it has been
pointed out that this was also the case for many other OECD countries.  Similarly, many other countries have
pursued liberalising policies in the last two decades but, nevertheless, NZ’s reforms stand out in both their
breadth and depth.  See Henderson  (1996).
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only 10.3% (down from 27% only 2 years earlier and projected to fall to less than 6% by
2000) and the trade-weighted average applied tariff rate across all goods was 5.2%.14
 The origins of protection in NZ have been traced back to the 1880’s when a depression
led to a switch in motivation for tariffs (and a general increase in the tariff level) from
revenue to sectoral protection (arguably as a response to declining natural protection
induced by falling ocean freight rates).15  For our purposes, however, we note only that in
1938 a foreign exchange crisis, which dramatically reduced NZ’s exchange reserves, led to
blanket import licensing in NZ.  Coverage fell over the next two decades but was restored
to 100% in 1958.  It gradually declined again until by the start of the 1970’s around 30% of
all imports were covered by licence requirements.
 At the same time a rather haphazard pattern of tariffs emerged, motivated largely by
import-substitution goals.  Accordingly, most raw materials were imported duty-free,
tariffs were modest on intermediates and generally high on finished goods: a pattern of
cascading tariffs with correspondingly high effective rates of protection.  Final goods were
only protected, however, if a domestic industry existed16 so nominal and effective rates of
protection were widely dispersed across industries.
                                                
14  Source: APEC Individual Action Plan: Tariff Summary for 1996, from Ministry of Commerce.
15  Lattimore and Wooding, 1996, p.317.
16  The existence of domestic industry was not exogenous, however! Roger Douglas cites the following from a
TV manufacturer in NZ: “We would go to Japan and explain…that our government wanted us to assemble
their TV sets in NZ…They said no one [else] assembles Japanese TV sets. ‘Do you have cheaper labour?’
they asked. ‘Make your own tubes? Transistors? Anything?’ ‘No,’ we said. ‘We just have to make them in
NZ; and because there are only a few of us permitted to do this, we make good money doing it.’ …[T]he
Japanese finally agreed to sell us the bits to assemble their sets in NZ. However, they explained this was very
costly. They were making tens of thousands of sets a day and we only wanted parts for a few thousand a year.
At great cost they contracted outside people to come in, take assembled sets apart, sort out all the pieces we
needed and put them in boxes.  They got engineers to write out all the instructions in English for reassembly,
and shipped them on their way… on average they charged us for the parts 110% of the price of the finished
goods… We then opened a factory, imported much machinery, paid the highest wages in the
neighbourhood… and finally produced a TV set … at twice the imported price.” (Alan Gibbs, quoted in
Douglas (1993 pp.27-28).)
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 The importance to NZ of external trade was certainly understood in this period and the
harmful consequences for exporting industries of high import restrictions was also
recognised.  However, the only responses to these observations were to introduce
additional distortions aimed to “compensate” exporters for the harm done to them by
import restrictions and to pursue a small degree of bilateral liberalisation with Australia in
the form of the original NAFTA of 1966.  This focus on exporters was also heightened in
the 50’s and 60’s by the perceived possibility of British entry into the European Common
Market and this stimulated a desire to promote greater diversification in NZ’s export base.
Accordingly, explicit export subsidies were introduced in the 1960’s and by the late 1970’s
there were many forms of explicit assistance to exporters, primarily of nontraditional
export products: export development expenditures were given tax write-offs; exporters
were given greater access to import licences; and an incremental export subsidy scheme
was introduced.  It has been estimated that in 1982/3 the pre-tax subsidy equivalent of
these incentives was over $400 million17 or nearly 17% of the total value of NZ exports.
 New Zealand’s trade policies had been perceived for some time to have negative
effects on resource allocation and these perceptions found a strong voice in a 1968 report
on the NZ economy prepared by the World Bank.  The first cautious steps to serious
reform were taken in 1969 at the National Development Conference, which recommended,
essentially, that protection of manufactures should be “tariffied”.  The government of the
day announced its intention to do this over a period of five years but this triggered such a
strong response from manufacturers that the proposal went to a committee that
recommended more cautious implementation.  In 1972 the government announced that it
had decided to postpone the tariffication measures and, instead, announced significant
                                                
17 Syntec Economic Services (1984, p.30)
FINAL –  February 1998
Page 10
increases in export incentives.  Furthermore, in 1978 a new (and what was to become very
generous) system of price supports for agricultural producers was introduced:
supplementary minimum prices (SMPs).
 From 1975-77 a Tariff Review Committee undertook a substantial review of NZ’s
tariff structure with a view to determining the, “level of tariff necessary to afford domestic
producers a reasonable degree of protection.”  In their 1978 report they identified 11
industries where the appropriate level was considered “excessive” and special Industry
Plans were developed for the restructuring of these industries by the Industries
Development Commission (IDC).18
 The first serious liberalisation of trade policy came in 1979 when the government
announced a number of major changes to import licensing.19,20 Consequently, import
licensing for non-IDC industries rapidly disappeared: in 1986 it was announced that import
licensing on all non-IDC industries would end in 1988.  Finally, import licensing ended for
all industries in 1992.
                                                
18  The IDC formulated plans for 15 industries in all: textiles, motor vehicles, carpets, tyres, general rubber,
shipbuilding, plastics, electronics, packing, wine, tobacco, writing instruments, fruit growing, eggs and milk.
19 That there was some reluctance is evidenced by the Minister of Finance's comment, rejecting the idea that
40 years of import licensing should be scrapped, that, “I have no intention of letting efficient industries go to
the wall for the sake of a theory” (cited in Lattimore and Wooding (1996 p.326).)
20 First, manufacturers could be granted licences to importing components where the domestically-produced
good had a, “manifestly excessive price, or quality problems compared with imports” or where use of the
domestic product would harm exports of finished goods.  Second, import licence tendering began.  While
initially small (being confined to only about 5% of the domestic market for certain consumer goods) many
commentators have identified this as an important step in the ultimate dismantling of the whole licensing
scheme, not least because it made visible the extraordinary premia that consumers were paying for many
imports. Pickford (1987b)  reports, for instance, that over 17% of the successful bids in the first 12 rounds of
the scheme involved premia of over 50% of the underlying value of the licence. Interestingly, by 1984 this
figure had fallen to less than 3%: this is indicative of the way in which the tender scheme was used to liberalise
licensing.  Increasing values of licences were put out to tender in successive rounds: 10% of the domestic
market in 1984 increasing to 15% in 1985.  If the premia paid remained low for a couple of rounds, or if total
tenders were less than the amount of licenses available, this was used as an indication that licensing could be
abolished on that product line.
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 In 1983 NAFTA was replaced by the far more comprehensive Closer Economic
Relations (CER) free trade area (FTA) agreement with Australia.  The original intention
was to develop a full FTA by 1995 with export incentives for trans-Tasman trade removed
by 1987, tariffs by 1988 and quotas by 1995.  In fact this was all achieved some 5 years
ahead of schedule, by the middle of 1990.  The FTA has gone beyond many other bilateral
agreements in also co-ordinating competition policies across the partners and removing
anti-dumping measures – see Vautier and Lloyd (1997) for more details.
 In 1985 the new Labour government announced its intentions of liberalising foreign
trade more rapidly than the previous government had envisaged, through reductions of
high tariffs on non-IDC industries.21  In 1986 the government also announced its intention
to convert all specific tariffs to ad valorem equivalents and in 1987 a Tariff Working Party
was set up, pre-empting a planned major review of 1988.
 This group recommended that tariffs should be reduced further and more uniformity
introduced into the tariff system and, in December of that year, the government announced
a plan for more radical tariff reform than initially envisaged in 1984.  The “Swiss formula”
of the GATT Tokyo Round was adopted to improve tariff uniformity and tariffs (including
those less than 20%) were cut in half by 1992 with IDC industries included as their plans
finished.
                                                
21 Initially, all such tariffs (on goods that were also produced in NZ) above 25% were to be reduced by 5% in
1986 and by a further 10% in 1987 prior to a major review in 1988.  Furthermore, tariff reductions on 500
product lines not made in NZ and not subject to import licensing were also introduced.  Pickford (1986) notes
that for most of these goods tariffs (some as high as 40%) were eliminated but for some the tariff was reduced
to 5%, “because of obligations to give major trading partners a preferred trading position in those areas”
(p.75).
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 In 1990 a schedule for further reductions beyond 1992 was announced but, with a new
government, this was suspended and a more modest proposal slated.22  Tariffs for the post-
1996 era were reviewed again in 1994 and the consequences of this review are noted in
Table 2. Furthermore, any tariff that was 5% or less on July 1 1996 will be removed by
1998.  These tariff reductions are scheduled to occur in 4 annual approximately equal
steps.  Finally, the few remaining specific tariffs  (most notably in some apparel lines) will
be reduced in accordance with the schedule for their ad valorem equivalents except for the
specific tariff on used autos.23
 (Table 2 here)
 So by the year 2000 there should only be four tariff rates applied in NZ: 0%, 5%, 10%
and 15%.  Finally, a further review in 1998 has been scheduled. “At that time the
Government will determine how to move towards a zero end point under a unilateral
domestic tariff reduction programme”.24
 What have been the consequences for NZ’s trade performance of these liberalisations?
New Zealand’s export mix has altered substantially over the last few decades, both in
terms of product lines and in terms of markets.  There is much less reliance on both
“traditional” export products (wool and meat) and “traditional” markets (particularly the
U.K.) with increased diversification, both in terms of actual destinations and in terms of
                                                
22 From 1992 general tariffs were cut by a third by 1996 with a maximum tariff of 14% (so any tariff no less
than 21% in 1992 was cut to 14% by 1996.)  This one-third reduction did not apply to certain of the “special”
sectors (notably carpets, apparel, some textiles, footwear and motor vehicles) and also no tariff in excess of
5% in 1992 was to be reduced to less than 5% by 1996.
23 This latter remains at NZ$1300 or $1500 (according to engine size) and is only incurred if it exceeds the
dollar amount of the duty that would be paid if the auto were subject to the going ad valorem rate on new cars.
24 Minister of Industry and Commerce, 16 December 1994.
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the number of trading partners.25  Of course, these trends have been occurring for some
time and cannot be attributed solely to the reforms.  But New Zealand enjoyed an export
boom from 1991 to 1995 and, interestingly enough, it was characterised by an increasing
volume and diversity of manufactured exports, in particular: from 1991 to 1995 non-food
manufacturing export volumes grew by 11% p.a., on average.26  A great deal of this growth
comes from exports to Australia: almost one quarter of NZ’s total manufactured exports
(including primary food processing) go to Australia and the value of that trade nearly
doubled from 1988 to 1994.27
 Some empirical work suggests that there is a structural break in both the NZ
merchandise export and import time-series around 1988/90 with real exports growing
significantly faster in the 91/95 period (6.4%) than in the 67/89 period (4%).28 Another
study looking at the performance of NZ exporters by markets and by product categories
measured against the performance of other exporters29 found that, over the period 1970-85,
the value of NZ’s exports grew substantially less than the value of world trade overall.
This was largely because of NZ’s export commodity composition, which was concentrated
on primary goods with slow-growing markets.  Over the period 1985-93 NZ’s overall
                                                
25 In 1950 over 40% of the value of NZ’s exports came from wool, nearly 16% from meat, 30% from dairy
products and less than 14% from other goods (Rayner and Lattimore (1991 p.35).) In 1995 wool accounted
for less than 7% of the total value of exports, meat for around 13% and dairy products for less than 14% with
other goods constituting 66% of total exports (NZ Treasury (1996 p.35).)  Similarly, while the U.K. took 66%
of NZ’s exports in 1950, the U.S. 10% and Australia only 3%, by 1995 Australia was the largest purchaser of
NZ exports, taking over 20%, while Japan was second at nearly 17% (with the U.S. third at 10% still.)  In
1995 only a little over 6% of NZs exports (by value) went to the U.K. (supra p.37).
26 NZ Treasury (1996 p.22).
27 Colgate (1995 p.15).
28 Lattimore and Wooding (1996).
29  Lattimore and McKeown (1995).
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export growth was still slower than world trade growth (and the main reason was again the
product mix) but the gap had narrowed dramatically.
 
 
 2. Focus on manufacturing
 The evolution of trade reform in New Zealand outlined above makes it clear that
manufacturing has long been the focus of – and driving force behind – protective efforts.
In this section we look more closely at the evolution of manufacturing protection in New
Zealand and the position of manufacturers re the reforms.  We then examine, in a little
more detail than above, the consequences for manufacturers of the trade reforms.
 As noted earlier, protection in New Zealand has long had a cascading pattern with high
restrictions on imports of finished goods that competed with domestic products and very
low or zero restrictions on raw materials and inputs or goods not produced domestically.
This was a conscious import-substitution strategy predicated upon a belief that
manufacturing was intrinsically valuable, a belief buttressed in later years by a desire to
diversify NZ’s export base.  At the National Development Conference of 1969, for
example, the Manufacturing Committee was, “directed to outline a national strategy for
attaining the optimum growth of the manufacturing sector … with particular reference to
the development of manufacturing activity that can contribute to a major breakthrough in
exports.”30 The Committee stresses the belief that positive externalities are likely with
manufacturing and goes on to recommend a number of measures the government should
take in order to support manufacturing.
                                                
30  NDC, 1969, Manufacturing Committee, Report of the Working Party on Industrial Policy, p.5.
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 This report may be the source of the subsequent understanding of manufacturers that
their protection was “needs-based” (see below).  Paragraph 101 of the report reads, “[t]he
essential point is that where industry requires protection this is because it has higher unit
costs and cannot market an equivalent product at the same price as a competing import”
(supra p.21).  Nevertheless, the Committee recommended that the form of protection
should change from quantitative restrictions to tariffs for a number of reasons: (1)
administrative simplicity (particularly in avoiding the decision of who gets licenses), (2)
revenue, (3) international acceptability, (4) greater responsiveness to foreign supply
changes and (5) greater ease of measurement of the costs of protection.
 In discussion of this Committee’s recommendations at the NDC plenary sessions, a
number of the stronger recommendations concerning industrial policy and protection were
referred to a select committee. These included the following:
 “212. That Government should proceed with all practicable haste to
implement its announced policy of dismantling the import licensing
system and replacing it with a policy of appropriate tariffs”
 
 “213. That Government be urged to continue the dismantling of the
import licensing scheme with all practicable speed” (our italics.)
 
 The select committee, which included the president of the Manufacturers’ Federation,
replaced these and other clauses with recommendation 209A which, while less enthusiastic
about the speed with which tariffication should occur, was nevertheless clear in endorsing
it.  The final recommendation passed by the Conference was the following:
 “209A: The manufacturing sector should be accorded a level of protection
sufficient to promote steady industrial development [and] increasing
manufactured exports…This level of protection, however, should be such
as to encourage competition efficiency and reasonable prices to other
sectors and to consumers … It is accordingly recommended that the
system of protection should be flexible, that import licensing should be
replaced by tariffs … and that this transition should be carried out …
within a reasonable time.  It is recognised, however, that there are cases
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where other protective measures including import licensing may be more
appropriate than a tariff.”
 
 By the time of the second NDC in March 1972, however, manufacturers had cold feet:
“in the light of changed conditions they no longer see recommendation 209A as
appropriate to maintain a level of confidence in the manufacturing sector…”.31  The review
committee redrafted the recommendation (and expanded it from its original 127 words to a
much-hedged and caveated 494 words in 4 parts with sections and subsections!)  The
thrust of the amended 209A is that tariffication is no longer the central point of the
recommendation but simply an option to be considered in consultation with industry etc.
etc.  As noted earlier, this led to the shelving of plans for reforms of the licensing scheme.
Interestingly, Federated Farmers of NZ, the Associated Chambers of Commerce of NZ, the
NZ Retailers’ Federation and the NZ Bureau of Importers and Exporters all made
submissions to this new Committee supporting the current version of 209A (p.21).  The
changed stance of the manufacturers suggests that the Committee’s findings, which
essentially acceded to the wishes of the Manufacturers’ Federation, did not stem from a
national belief in the infant industry and externality arguments floated in favour of
continued high assistance to manufacturing but rather from the political power of
manufacturers as a group.
 When the 1979 budget announced the first tendering of licenses, it was with the intent
of not only introducing some foreign competition into consumer goods industries but also
to get some sense, via the size of tender premia, of the magnitude of protection that was
being afforded through the licensing system. Manufacturers continued to resist tariffication
                                                
31 Quoted in the Introduction to the Review of 209A by the Committee on Industrial Policy, NDC 1972, p.9.
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even as license tendering increased, until acquiescing to a gradual programme in 1984. The
Treasury, in its background papers for the 1984 Economic Summit, notes that,
 “[i]n order to pursue the goals of assistance reform in activities outside
those subject to industry plans, discussions were initiated last year [1983]
with the NZ Manufacturers’ Federation, aimed at developing arrangements
for the gradual switch from import licensing to tariffs as the prime means
of protection.  … The motivation for [a rule suggesting that increases in
license allocations for tender would depend positively on tender premia] is
to ensure that a somewhat faster rate of adjustment to import competition
is faced by the most highly assisted (“tall poppy”) industries as revealed by
the size of tender premia”32 (our italics).
 
 Despite this, it appears that manufacturers had a sense that the premia were to
determine the “scientific tariff” needed by each industry, along the lines of the
Manufacturing Committee Report at the NDC some ten years earlier!  So the
Manufacturers’ Federation could write in their newsletter of May 1984 of their
understanding that the, “tariff would be based on the needs of the particular industry
provided those needs were not ‘very high’ (150-200 percent duty)”.33   The acquiescence of
manufacturers in 1983 to the principle of tariffication and reform (the latter perhaps
unknowingly!)  was the beginning of the end as far as protection of manufacturing was
concerned.  The new Labour government of 1984 devalued the currency by 20% and
explicitly argued that this, “devaluation has created conditions conducive to an acceleration
of this assistance reform programme. In particular, the devaluation will produce an
increase in the cost of imported goods (and thereby an increase in the level of protection)
and an increase in export returns”.34
                                                
32   NZ Treasury (1984 pp.307-308).
33  Cited in Lattimore and Wooding (1996 p.329).
34  From the statement of the Minister of Trade and Industry to the Economic Summit in 1984 (p. 88).
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 The general lesson that emerges from this discussion is that the favoured position of
manufacturers in NZ can be attributed in part to a general belief on the part of planners and
policy-makers in the desirability of manufacturing per se and in part to the strength of
manufacturers as a political group.  One feature of protection in New Zealand that has
survived all the reforms is a favouring of certain industries within the manufacturing
sector.  So in the 1994 Tariff review for 1996-2000 the Minister of Commerce and
Industry noted, “[a]s in the past special consideration has been given to the textiles,
apparel, footwear and automotive industries”.35   Before turning to political economy
explanations of protection of manufacturing in NZ, however, it is instructive to look more
closely at the consequences for the manufacturing sector of the general reforms to date. In
light of the wide scope of NZ’s reforms, however, the following caveat is instructive:
“when contemplating likely results from past and present liberalizations, it is important to
keep in mind that trade often plays a distant second fiddle to bigger macroeconomic
issues.”36
 It is clear that the initial impact of the reforms on the manufacturing sector was
strongly negative but, in recent years, perhaps as a consequence of other reforms
(particularly to the transport industry and to labour markets in NZ), output and,
                                                
35 Minister of Industry and Commerce, 16 December 1994.
36 Levinsohn (1996).
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particularly, exports have picked up.37  Furthermore, exporting has become more
significant in most product lines for all size firms as shown in Table 3.
 (Table 3 here)
 It would be of some interest to know the role played by both existing firms and new
entrants into manufacturing in the recent export boom. Roberts et al (1996) report that only
about a half of export growth in their micro-study of several export booms is attributable to
incumbent exporters: the rest comes from non-exporters choosing to export.  In the NZ
case, one study of firm behaviour from 1987 to 1991 found that approximately half (1123
out of 2551) of the manufacturing firms surveyed who were exporters in 1987 (and still
existed in 1991) were no longer exporters. Over the same period, only a small fraction
(about 9%) of firms that sold only to the domestic market in 1987 had become exporters
by 1991.38
 The most significant sectors that continue to attract high protection are motor vehicles
(assembly and component production) and textiles, clothing and footwear.  Nevertheless,
as protection of motor vehicles has declined, imports have increased and the sector has
shrunk dramatically already.  New Zealand has also experienced a large increase in
imported used cars from Japan in recent years and this has also contributed to domestic
production falling – by almost 50% in the last ten years.  Employment in the assembly
                                                
37 Hazledine and Murphy (1996) report that while the real output of resource-based manufacturing industries
grew by some 22% in total from 1984 to 1992 (and employment there declined some 24%), overall
manufacturing grew by less than 6% over that period (and employment declined by almost 21%.)  This is
somewhat misleading in that 1992 was a recession year: by 1995 unemployment had fallen from the 10.3% of
1992 to 6.3% and manufacturing increased from 16.7% of total employment to 18.2% (OECD (1996).)
Nevertheless, manufacturing real GDP was over 15% lower in 1991 than in 1984 (Colgate (1996 p.7).)  But
exports of non-commodity manufactures grew by 3.5%, 9.4%, 19.4%, 12.7% and 20.7% in each of the years
1990 through 1994 (Colgate (1995 p.8).)
38  Malcolm (1993 p.56).  This survey is likely to underestimate the move into exporting for a number of
reasons: it does not include new entrants; it is not clear if the export category refers to firms that only export as
opposed to those with domestic sales as well; and it looks at 1991, a recession year.
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industry at the beginning of 1997 was only 2,200 people with a little more than that
employed in production of components.39  Finally, in late 1997 the government announced
that all tariffs on new and used auto imports would be abolished in the year 2000, falling
from 15% in July of that year to zero in December.  Table 4 shows the consequences of
tariff reforms for the nominal tariff on imported, completely assembled autos in NZ and
Table 5 provides some basic statistics for passenger cars in NZ.
 (Tables 4 and 5  here)
 In the TCF industries, employment is somewhat larger but has also declined following
liberalisation. Around 31,000 people were employed in the apparel and textiles industries
in 1985 and only about 20,000 in 1994.
 The recent export boom in manufactures, discussed earlier, has surprised a number of
commentators: NZ’s comparative advantage clearly lies in primary products and one
would anticipate that if trade liberalisation improves resource allocation then any export
boom should come from the primary sector.  That this has not been the case is probably
due in part to the patchwork pattern of tariff compensation to agriculture in NZ, which
attempted to lessen the export tax component of import restrictions.  Furthermore, NZ’s
actual experience fits quite well with the thesis advanced by Olson (1987). He suggests
that high protection of manufactures, “facilitate[s] collective action to collude and
cartelize” (p.256) which in turn  distorts resource allocation further and leads to greater
inefficiencies.  Accordingly, one would anticipate very low export ratios in such sectors.
Liberalisation then induces an increase in exports of the protected sector.  Our discussion
of the evolution of the manufacturers’ position in NZ certainly suggests that protection
                                                
39 It should be noted that over 40% of the output of the components industry is exported so this employment is
not totally dependent on the domestic assembly industry.
…
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facilitated collusion on a political front and enabled manufacturers to wield surprising
political power.
 This discussion brings us to the political economy of protection of manufactures in
NZ. Some efforts have been made to try and explain the pattern of assistance to
manufacturing industries in terms of industry features.  One study regressing industry
assistance (trade protection as well as assorted subsidies and tax concessions) on industry
characteristics in 1981/2 found that assistance was higher, ceteris paribus,
• the lower the skill level of workers (measured by educational achievement),
• the lower the industry’s growth rate,
• the lower were transport costs  (i.e. natural protection),
• the less important were exports and
• the higher the number of firms in the industry.40
 Employment and labour-intensity were not found to be significant.  This study omitted
the motor vehicle assembly industry, for reasons of data problems, and is therefore likely
to be influenced largely by the extremely high protection accorded to other industries such
as textiles, apparel and footwear.  Interestingly, however, they found that geographical
concentration tended to reduce protection although it was concentration in non-urban areas
that had this effect.  This fits with a suggestion by John Yeabsley that high assistance to
TCF industries might be attributable, in part, to the fact that they are relatively high
employers of rural women and find a political voice through that.41
                                                                                                                                           
40  Gibson and Lattimore (1991).
41 In 1994 there were still some 800 plants in the apparel industry, for example, scattered through the country,
and employing an average of 20 employees each (Ministry of Commerce, 1997).  Accordingly, the results of
Gibson and Lattimore may well be driven by the high protection accorded to this single very scattered sector.
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 The finding that protection increased with the number of firms in an industry runs
counter to common arguments that pressure group formation and thus political
effectiveness will be hampered by free-rider problems as the number of firms increases.
Of course, these numbers are small anyway, in the NZ case (the authors report an average
of 60 versus 164 in Australia) and may reflect the incentives for entry to protected
industries.  These incentives will be limited, however, by quotas as opposed to tariff
protection.
 Another more recent study looks at the pattern of plant exit in NZ manufacturing
from 1986 to 1989.42  Over this period, the effective rate of assistance for manufacturing
declined from 39% to 19% and nearly 20% of their initial sample of around 4000 medium
to large plants had exited by late 1989.  The study attempts to explain exit with a range of
plant, firm and industry characteristics, finding that exit was more likely
• by high-cost, larger and younger plants
• if the plant was owned by a firm that owned more than one plant
• if it was not foreign-owned
• the greater was the fall in the effective rate of assistance to the industry and
• the more significant was import licensing as an element of that assistance.
                                                
42  Gibson and Harris (1996).
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 While interpretation of these results as consequences of trade liberalisation is a little
doubtful,43 they do suggest the unsurprising result that highly protected industries were also
highly inefficient.
 The study also notes that the exporters in the sample tend to have larger plants, have
fewer plants per firm, use more specialised capital and be younger than the overall sample
average. “With the exception of plant age, the characteristics of successful exporters are
also the major characteristics of surviving plants” (p.19). A recent paper by Clerides et al
(1996) examines the same episodes of export booms as Roberts et al, and suggests that
there is a self-selection of efficient firms into exporting.  This in turn suggests that, ceteris
paribus, exit of non-exporters as in the NZ case will tend to be efficiency-improving.
 All in all, these studies suggest that the pattern of protection of manufacturing in New
Zealand had been motivated as much by “social policy” concerns as by anything else.
This fits well with the persistence of protection for certain sectors through the reforms and
might explain why NZ’s unilateral reforms did not jump immediately to full free trade.
Indeed, from the initial major reforms in the early 1980’s, the current schedule is such that
NZ will have taken over 2 decades to reach full free trade.
 Another explanation that has been put forward for the persistence of sectoral protection
is that when the Labour government of 1984 introduced sweeping reforms it essentially
“outflanked” the National party, its main Opposition.  In subsequent elections, and as a
                                                
43 All other things equal one would anticipate, for example, that high-cost, young plants are more likely to exit
in any sample and the interesting question is then how trade reform changes the nature of the exit decision. If
trade liberalisation is adequately controlled for through the fall in ERAs then presumably one would like to
know how this interacts with the other independent variables.  If trade liberalisation is not captured by the fall
in ERAs then to interpret these numbers as consequences of reforms solely because of the time period chosen
one would also need to consider an earlier post-reform period as a control.  Also, macroeconomic effects may
have been present and these are not controlled for: in particular, real interest rates were very high and the
economy was flat over this period.
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backlash against the reforms mounted, National chose to “differentiate their product” by
pledging their support for freer trade as a practical matter rather than an ideological one.44
Accordingly, they had few qualms about continued protection for certain sectors and,




 The negative consequences of import protection for exporters have long been recognised
in New Zealand (this is evidenced in statements by agricultural representatives at the NDC
in 1969 and also explains, in part, the cascading pattern of protection that evolved to the
1970s.)  The political response to this, however, has typically been to offer additional
interventions designed to offset these consequences rather than to question the initial
protection itself.
 This interpretation of assistance to primary producers as “tariff compensation” is
widespread. Lattimore and Wooding (1996 p.319) note that the introduction of producer
marketing boards with monopoly export rights in the 1930s was an explicit quid pro quo
for increased protection of imports.  Others have argued that attempts at trade
“liberalisation” commencing around 1962, “can be characterized as an attempt to move
closer to neutrality in trade intervention by the provision of compensation to exporters for
the effects of import protection”46 and that, “a stated justification of the supplementary
                                                
44  This also fits with the comments of NZ negotiators following the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the
GATT, discussed below.
45 This argument has been suggested to us by Paul Wooding.
46  Lattimore and Rayner (1991 p.10).
FINAL –  February 1998
Page 25
minimum price (SMP) scheme [a price support scheme for certain agricultural products
introduced in 1978] was to compensate farmers for cost excesses due to protection to the
manufacturing industries”.47  Tariff compensation finds its most explicit official voice,
however, in the Minister of Finance, the Rt. Hon. Robert Muldoon, in the 1982 Budget
(p.10): “[t]he chief purpose of the export incentives is to compensate exporters for the high
costs they face because of import protection.”
 Thus, quite ironically given its comparative advantage, New Zealand developed a
system of high assistance to agriculture. EGWT (p.39) report that the effective rate of
assistance to pastoral agriculture, looking at all forms of transfers, was in excess of 30% in
much of the early part of the 1980s (largely due to SMP payments), reaching a peak of
120% in 1983.  However, it has been argued that, apart from in 1983 (when the true
effective rate of assistance was 25%) these payments did not fully compensate farmers for
the losses incurred through import protection.48
 The consequences of the reforms for agriculture have been dramatic.  EGWT report
that effective transfers to the sector were negative by 1990 and rationalisation has been
extensive: farm land prices fell sharply with deregulation and the pattern of farming has
changed – sheep numbers fell by 30% in the decade from 1985 to 1995, for example.
 Interestingly, however, farmers as a group were big supporters (indeed leaders of the
dominant farmer organisation were initiators) of the reform of the early-mid 1980s.  To
trace the origins of this it is helpful to expand analysis of the state of agriculture in the
period leading up to the reforms.
                                                
47  Chiao and Scobie (1990 p.1).
48  Chiao and Scobie (1990).
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 From the middle of the 1970s to the onset of the reforms agricultural subsidies were, as
we have mentioned, designed to compensate agriculture for the high levels of protection
afforded manufacturing.49 In part this stemmed from the deteriorating balance of payments
and growing public debt.50  Evidence for concern about export performance is revealed by
the establishment of an export subsidy scheme for manufactures.51 At the same time the
subsidy schemes were designed to generate extra output (i.e. exports) from agriculture as
well.52  These incremental subsidies sought to produce extra output at a lower government
budgetary cost than if the same intended output expansion was engendered by broad-based
subsidies.  Evans and Morgan (1983) report many of the subsidy schemes of the late 1970s
and early 1980s resulted in user costs of capital inputs which, at the time of investment,
were virtually zero, and in some cases negative.  This subsidisation meant that the marginal
rate of return to investment on farms was much higher than the average rate of return
farmers were experiencing on their businesses as a whole.  While it may have encouraged
extra production it did not raise the profitability of farming vis à vis that of other industries.
So farmers as a group came to perceive that their share of economic rents resulting from
government management of the economy was less than that they would achieve in a much
less centrally controlled economy.
                                                
49   The extent of agricultural subsidies for the period 1979-97 is described by SONZA (1997, p.123-124).
The subsidies took a wide variety of forms. Some were the outcome of mechanisms designed to smooth
farmers' fluctuating incomes. These often took the form of low interest guaranteed loan facilities to finance
producer boards’ cost of carry in their activity of trading in markets (eg the wool market) in attempts to
ameliorate the fluctuations in prices that faced farmers. Others were direct input (eg fertiliser) subsidies and
output subsidies.
50   Statistics New Zealand (1996, 359 and 564).
51   The history of export incentives is described by Wooding (1987, 96-98).
52   The widespread subsidisation of the 1970s and early 1980s separated economy-wide incentives guiding
production and investment decisions from the country’s terms of trade, that for meat and wool, have been
declining since their relatively high level of 1972-3 (see SONZA (1997, pp.92-96)).
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 Farmers anticipated higher (average) rewards from comparative advantage in a
deregulated economy.  Just prior to the reforms, subsidies and regulation had reached the
point where they were widely perceived as not sustainable. This, and the belief that in a
fully de-regulated economy farming would achieve a higher income share, predisposed
farmer support for the reforms and farmer special interest groups have broadly supported
the reforms since their inception.
 In 1985, the reform of agriculture started abruptly with the removal of subsidies. It was
accompanied by plans for reform of other sectors, but was almost contemporaneous with
de-regulation of the financial sector and the foreign exchange market. Significant state
sector reform did not start until 1988 and labour market reform did not take place until
1991. With the exception of changes to the regulatory framework for natural resource use,
the statutory monopoly of a number of producer boards remains the key unresolved source
of statutory constraints on agriculture.53  These boards’ statutory powers include the right to
levy producers, compulsory product purchase, the sole right of export, and the
responsibility for the administration of quotas imposed by foreign countries.  The effect of
these boards on competitive supply, price signals and efficient provision of supply,
marketing, contracting and transport services is under wide scrutiny and debate.
 The general reform programme also included re-consideration of legislation controlling
town and country development.   The Resource Management Act of 1992 replaced all
previous legislation and its goal was to a framework for sustainable use of resources. The
focus of the Act is to promote sustainable land use while placing greater weight on effects
                                                
53  There have been some changes.  The deregulation of egg production and distribution and the Wool Board
withdrawing from its buffer stock scheme are examples, but there has been little change in function or
structure of the board encompassing the largest business: the New Zealand Dairy Board.
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of actions, rather than actions themselves, and on property owners’ rights to make
decisions. Because the Resource Management Act replaces, rather than builds on, previous
case law its introduction has injected uncertainty into planning and development
procedures for agriculture. Local government authorities have the responsibility of
administering the Act and they have adopted various positions on the trade-off between
regulatory restriction and unfettered decision-making by owners; although they are
constrained by the requirement that restrictions be justified by economic analysis. There is
uncertainty about the enforceability of some local government positions and promulgated
regulations. In many regions the new Act has provided more freedom to subdivide
properties for various purposes, and it is sustaining a trend to smaller farms which really
started in the mid 1980s as farmers sought to restructure their debt.
 In the context of the other planned reforms, the rapid de-regulation of the financial
(including foreign exchange) sectors and fully funding of the government budget deficit
resulted in a period of very high interest rates and real exchange rate in 1985.  In
conjunction with the simultaneous removal of agricultural subsidies the profitability of
farming was vastly reduced and agriculture retrenched.  The decline in farm land prices in
the 1985-88 period was as much as 50 per cent in real terms.  Restructuring was not
smoothed by government-sponsored transitional arrangements, and a number of farmers
were bankrupted.   Others retained ownership by selling portions of their farms.
 Agriculture has changed and diversified. Its commodities now account for less than 50
per cent of total exports, and there has been much change in operation and the product mix.
Meat and wool farms have borne the brunt of change. The decline in sheep numbers and
expansion of forestry reflect the low terms of trade for sheep products and reversion from
the high levels of capital stock resulting from the pre-reform policy of encouraging extra
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production with scant regard for international product price signals.54  It also reflects the
relative profitability of sheep and forestry, in part engendered by world prices and in part by
the exceptional tax treatment of forestry.
 Although diversification into deer farming and horticulture and wine production
started in the 1970s and early 1980s, it has been consolidated since that time. Indeed,
horticultural export growth has accounted for much of the growth in agricultural value
added and exports broadly defined. The strong growth of tourism in the 1990s has made it
a major foreign exchange earner, and it has been associated with changes to farms to meet
tourism demands.
 The changed operation of farms reflects the need for individual farmers to manage their
own risk rather than rely on government programmes, and benefits associated with
contracting directly with customers for specific products. Their larger size, permitting
specialisation of labour and better access to capital markets, may entail corporate farms
having advantages over the family farm in both these areas. Although they are few in
number, there are now more public corporations in farming than in 1984.
 Industries supplying inputs to agriculture have followed agriculture’s cycle. In
particular, the meat packing industry, which was once heavily regulated, has had to
undergo major restructuring since entry became open in the early 1980s, as sheep numbers
have declined, and in response to demands for value-added meat products rather than meat
as a commodity. The restructuring has carried with it a number of bankruptcies resulting in
significant losses to shareholders and farmers. The industry still has excess capacity,
                                                
54  Sheep numbers fell by 30 percent between 1985 and 1995. Between 1960 and 1990 the peak level of new
production forest plantings was in 1985. Following the changed tax treatment of forestry (in 1991) and the
lower relative profitability of sheep farming, forestry planting jumped to almost twice this peak by 1995
(Statistics New Zealand (1996, 396)).
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particularly under the current more flexible terms of employment, and is likely to remain
volatile for some time to come.
 Rural New Zealand is continuing to change rapidly in the directions already indicated.
It is affected by factors which include ancillary industries' adjustments, the major change to
the regulation of resource use and the continuing expansion of tourism. It is more
diversified and has a continuing decline in the importance of traditional farming operations
and products. Agriculture’s contribution to GDP and exports have grown since the onset of
the reforms. But between 1991 and 1996 pastoral farming’s share of exports fell from 46%
to 43%, and between 1994 and 1997 the contribution of farming to GDP fell from 6.2% to
4.9%.55  Philpott (1994) estimates that during the 10 years since 1984 agricultural and
horticultural GDP grew by 6.4 per cent per annum, and total factor productivity by 7.7 per
cent, much of it attributable to horticulture. He suggests that the average labour
productivity of agriculture has increased more rapidly than in manufacturing over the
reform period. Finally, between 1979-81 and 1996 producer subsidy equivalents, expressed
as a percentage of the value of agricultural output averaged across all OECD countries
increased from 29% to 36%.56  For New Zealand the percentage decreased from 18% to 3%
in the mid-1980s and it has remained at this low level.
 With this background we return again to the political economy of New Zealand’s
agricultural reform. The abrupt reduction in profitability of farming in the mid-1980s did
not change the pro-deregulation stance of leaders of New Zealand’s farming interest
groups. Their response was not to change their commitment to de-regulation, consequent
                                                
55   SONZA (1997, 120-122).
56 See SONZA (1997, 123).  Producer subsidy equivalents indicate the value of transfers from domestic
consumers and taxpayers to farmers, as measured by the difference between domestic and world prices.
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to the plight of farmers, but rather it was to regard the costs as transitional and to speed up
the process of reform by promoting further de-regulation of other sectors of the economy.
In particular, they have been firm advocates of reducing border protection and government
expenditure.  They have held this position throughout the 1986-97 period despite some
reverses in interest group membership; but without the formation of competing farmer-
representative organisations.57  It may be that the current distribution of rents is regarded as
being as much to farmers’ advantage as could be expected under further regulation and
subsidies, especially given the increased international pressure, under the GATT
agreement of the Uruguay Round, for other countries to de-regulate their agriculture.
Indeed, NZ’s unilateral stance towards agricultural subsidies offers this country’s
agriculture a prominent exemplary leadership role that may aid gaining access to markets.
 
 
 III.  The political economy of New Zealand’s unilateral trade reforms
 There has been in the New Zealand experience a remarkable change in the direction and
coalition of interest group pressures. In addition to agricultural interest groups,
manufacturers have also advocated government expenditure reductions during the 1990s.
Their position reflects these groups’ perception that the lower this expenditure the less
pressure that monetary policy will place on interest rates and concomitantly on the
exchange rate: ergo, lower government expenditure leads to a lower exchange rate. It is not
the argument about this linkage that is remarkable; rather it is that farmers and
                                                
57 It must be noted that New Zealand farmer organisations are also very active in reacting to land use
regulations brought down under the Resource Management Act 1992, and to managing issues arising under
the Occupational Health and Safety in Employment Act  1992. The former Act, in particular, has most
significant implications for farming.
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manufacturers have joined in forces in their advocacy of a point of view. It reflects the
long-held view of farming leaders about border protection and consequent domestic costs
and the fact that exporting is now so important to manufacturing that the goals of its
representative group have become aligned with many of those of farming.  Prior to the
1990s, with manufacturing under a protective, umbrella the interests of the two groups
were quite different.  It may be that the coalition of interests will be strong enough to
preserve New Zealand’s low and declining border protection, thus making this aspect of
the reforms more sustainable.
 Political interest group influence has changed in other ways.  In the mid-1980s the
New Zealand Business Roundtable (NZBR) established a secretariat that has continued to
finance and conduct studies across a wide spectrum of economic and social policy areas.
The reports have not had a sectoral point of view but have typically argued for policies that
entail an open and competitive economy with reduced government.58  They have been
influential, partly as a consequence of their frequently employing academics (often US
academics) to author their studies.  Such a grouping did not exist prior to 1984 and the
concordance of its views with many of the common policies of farmer and manufacturer
organisations yields a consensus about the direction of the economy from the business
sector that will continue to advocate low levels of border protection in NZ.
 Before turning to specific issues in the political economy of NZ’s unilateral trade
reforms we should stress again that no aspect of NZ’s economic reforms can be analysed
in isolation.  We argue below, for example, that an important (perhaps the most important)
                                                
58  Membership of the NZBR is for CEOs by invitation.  The NZBR represents most of the large NZ business
interests drawn from all parts of the business sector.  The focus is, “the general economy rather than particular
sectors or industries” (NZBR Statement of Purpose.)
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1. Perceptions of NZ’s performance and the need for change
 
 As NZ’s trade liberalisation was, in many respects, just another facet of general economic
liberalisation so the causes of and motivations for the latter apply equally to the former.
Thus general dissatisfaction with the hands-on economic management style of the
outgoing National government, for instance, may have been as important a motivator in
trade liberalisation as any other factor.  However, we have noted already that criticism of
NZ’s trade policy regime, both from within and from external commentators, had been
around for some decades and had been growing.  So the 1968 World Bank report on the
NZ economy was quite explicit in its criticism of NZ’s reliance on high protection in
general and QRs in particular: “[t]he most important single measure which can help make
NZ manufacturing internationally competitive is its gradual exposure to competition from
imports.  This requires a removal of quantitative import restrictions and a reliance on
[temporary] tariff protection [which] … should be gradually reduced.”59  This criticism




 An important question that needs to be answered is why NZ chose to reform its economy
in such an extensive fashion and in such a short time period.  That some drastic change
should occur was almost inevitable (but see Kelsey (1995, Chap. 14) for a dissenting view)
                                                
59  IBRD 1968, p.14.
…
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but it is not obvious why such a broad programme of reforms should have been initiated.
When the Labour party took government in 1957, for instance, they also faced
deteriorating FX reserves but responded by imposing 100% import licensing.
 The difference probably lies in the coincidence of economic and constitutional crises
and in the fact that the incoming government had (at least, some of its key members had) a
coherent and already-articulated philosophy of economic management.  Furthermore, the
outgoing government had been characterised by a general policy of extreme
interventionism in the economy and there were no clear signs that it had been at all
effective.  Accordingly there was a strong sense of dissatisfaction with the idea that activist
government policy could be a panacea for all – or any – ills.  Indeed, it’s been suggested
that the overwhelming support for the Labour government of 1984 was less an
endorsement of their reform package (which was largely unannounced in their
campaigning) than a rejection of what went before.60
 As far as trade policy is concerned, the timing of these crises was such that real
alternatives to unilateral liberalisation were few.  We have argued that it had been clear
since the late 60’s that trade reform was needed in NZ, but neither multilateralism nor
bilateralism were immediate enough to be attractive to the reformers.  Speed of reform was
highly emphasised by the Labour reformers.61  GATT was between rounds with the Tokyo
Round having left many unsettled issues and the direction of the U.S. was uncertain –
while encouraging a further round of GATT talks it also passed the Trade and Tariff Act of
                                                                                                                                           
60  In fact, de-regulation was proposed and did find political favour in that election.  The New Zealand Party,
formed only months before the election, gained a remarkable 12.6% of the vote on a de-regulatory platform.
61   Roger Douglas elevates speed to the status of a Principle of successful Reform in Unfinished Business:
“Speed is essential.  It is almost impossible to go too fast” (p.222).
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1984 granting presidential authority to negotiate bilateral deals.  Multilateralism through
the GATT could not be initiated by NZ and the delay involved in negotiating reciprocity
for domestic reforms, if it could be done at all, would have been too great.  Indeed, there
was explicit recognition in Treasury that NZ was too small a player to have any effects on
the policies of other countries, be they trade policies or any other form of industry
assistance.
 The main bilateral option available was in trade with Australia and, indeed, the pace of
this was accelerated, as we have noted, but in tandem with unilateral liberalisation.
 
 
3. The role of individuals
 
 Antagonists and protagonists alike attribute the reforms to a, “conjunction of
personalities, economics, politics and the prevailing ideology” (Kelsey (1995, p.353)) and
it is inevitable that personalities must be involved to some extent in a country with the
population the size of Toronto.  Roger Douglas' role in initiating and leading the institution
of the reforms, along with key advisers and other members of parliament, is clearly
significant and is well documented elsewhere.62 Nevertheless, EGWT suggest that this
aspect of the reforms has been overstressed.  It is certainly the case that the initial
enthusiasm for reform was coincident with Labour party principles (as witnessed by
subsequent comments of the then-prime minister, David Lange, who remarked in 1989
that, “I apologise … for nothing of what we did to begin with …in the course of about
three years we changed from being a country run like a Polish shipyard into one that could
                                                
62   See, for example, Bollard (1994).
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be internationally competitive”.63  Both those in favour of and those against the reforms
also acknowledge a growing consensus amongst academics – and awareness amongst key
public servants – that the NZ economy was over-regulated and that liberalisation to some
degree was inevitable.  As already suggested, this consensus did not just spring up
overnight but had been foreshadowed many years earlier.  The notion, then, that the
reforms were somehow an aberration or purely a product of personalities seems difficult to
maintain.
 Surprisingly, particularly in contrast to the experience in Australia where it was a
strong factor in promoting reform, explicit academic criticism of NZ’s trade policy
continued to be  muted.64  The infant-industry argument was generally accepted as a valid
theoretical rationale for protection and, as we have seen, there was a strong belief in the
external benefits of manufacturing.  Even at the Economic Summit of 1984 when
manufacturers themselves were facing up to the reality of life with import competition, the
submission of a leading academic economist, while decrying the particularly high levels of
protection in certain sectors, wrote,
 “[t]here are strong arguments for a continuing level of uniform protection
– arguments which in our view stem largely from:
(i) Pessimism about the future growth in overseas demand for
traditional agricultural export products.
(ii) The high NZ propensity to import such that faster export
led growth tends to be frustrated by the spill over into imports.
 … There is in fact an optimal level of protection justified by the need to
ensure an industrial structure which produces the highest GDP or standard
of living possible”.65
                                                
63   Kelsey (1995, p.38).
64  An exception had been Wilfred Candler (professor of agricultural economics at Massey University) who
many years earlier in 1963 had published an unsigned article in The Economist entitled “How to Progress
Backward.”
65   Economic Summit Conference (1984 p.535).
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1. Domestic political institutions
 The structure of NZ’s political system is such that opportunities for far-reaching reforms
are more easily taken than in many other systems.  New Zealand operates a Westminster-
style Parliament but with a single House.  Accordingly, there is no upper body to overrule
decisions made by the elected Parliament.  There is no single written constitutional
document and there are no provincial or state legislatures.  Further, until 1996 the electoral
system was a FPP or first-past-the-post system in which every Member of Parliament was
a local representative of some geographical constituency.   Parliament was (and still is,
though to a lesser extent with the introduction of proportional representation in 1996)
dominated by two parties, Labour and National.  Party loyalty has traditionally been very
strong with the effect that government has effectively been by Cabinet.  Accordingly, a
small group of like-minded individuals can effect rapid and far-reaching change with less
opposition than might be encountered in a more pluralistic system.
 One very significant counter to this, however, is that the Government is elected for
only three years at a time.  As such it has severe restraints on its ability to enact unpopular
policies if they are not broadly supported.  This time constraint provided an incentive for
rapid reform and, in consequence, an inducement for packages of reforms: in the context
of significant reforms there was simply not time to rely only on bilateralism.
 
 
2. The role of domestic policy advisors
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 The main institutions here are the NZ Treasury and, to a lesser extent, the Reserve
Bank of New Zealand.  There were other institutions engaged in public debate but with far
less influence – the NZ Planning Council, for instance, issued occasional papers and
reports until its demise in 1991 – but Treasury has been the main source of economic
policy advice to the NZ government for some decades. Treasury in New Zealand serves a
role which in many other countries is found in a Finance Department as well as a Treasury:
it is the main source of economic analysis, briefing and advice to government.  As an
advisory body it tends to stay out of open public debate, a feature which has led many
critics to view it as pushing a “secret agenda” and as somehow bypassing the democratic
process.  So critics have perceived its “strategy” as seeking, “to impart information and
bring important interests on board, not to consult them about the nature and direction of
change.”66
 It has been well-documented (see EGWT, for example) that a number of Treasury
officials had received postgraduate training in the U.S. and were well-versed in
developments in microeconomic theory, particularly concerning public choice, contracting
issues, the economics of information and so forth.  In fact, Treasury was one of the most
important conduits of such developments to New Zealand given the relative non-
involvement of academics in the policy debate at the time and the positions taken by those
that were prepared to debate the reforms.
 The Treasury put together an influential briefing document for the incoming Labour
government entitled Economic Management and the coincidence of its views on reform
with those of Roger Douglas gave added impetus to the Labour Party’s commitment to
                                                
66  Kelsey (1995) p.34.
…
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reform. The Treasury position had evolved over a number of decades as their views





 We have already noted the impact of reports on the NZ economy by institutions such as the
World Bank, the IMF and the OECD.  It should also be noted that NZ’s trade policy had
been affected frequently by relations with major trading partners.  Tariffs on autos have
never been totally eliminated, for instance, and one reason has been British pressure to
maintain a tariff preference on UK cars.  Another example was the U.S. response to NZ
export subsidies in the late 70’s/early 80’s when NZ was persuaded to sign the GATT code
on countervailing duties.  The proximate cause of this was a threat by the U.S. to remove
an injury test in evaluating U.S. firms’ complaints about subsidised exports from NZ.68
 The role of Closer Economic Relations with Australia (CER), particularly as far as
trade reform was concerned, is an interesting but difficult one.  Clearly CER was important
in that it provided the first breath of competition to NZ’s domestic industries.
Furthermore, Lloyd (1996) has suggested that CER provided a valuable “demonstration
effect” on both sides of the Tasman, showing that trade liberalisation did not lead to the
end of the world as we know it and thus reassuring policy-makers and voters alike that
further liberalisation was also unlikely to be catastrophic.  It is interesting to note that
overall CER progress has slowed since 1990 or so and that the main reason seems to be
                                                                                                                                           
67  Bollard (1994) p.90.
68  See Lattimore and Wooding (1996) p.329.
…
FINAL –  February 1998
Page 40
Australian reluctance to go much further.  Lloyd writes, “[i]n the 1992 negotiations the
New Zealand government was anxious to see the Agreement extended [principally to
capital flows and services.] … Australia saw the agreements as a free trade agreement
which had almost been completed.”69
 At a theoretical level, it has also been suggested (Richardson (1993)) that FTAs might
lead, endogenously, to declining external tariffs in a political economy setting.  However,
NZ officials have suggested that CER was more an epiphenomenon of general
liberalisation rather than a cause (as already suggested it is certainly true that progress
under CER was rapidly overtaken by other developments.)
 Disentangling the effects of CER from those of unilateral liberalisation is an
impossible task.  Australia has become NZ’s largest trading partner and is particularly
important as a destination for manufacturing exports but how much of this would have
occurred in the absence of CER is hard to know.  While lower Australian trade barriers are
a factor in NZ’s manufacturing export boom so are resource reallocation effects of NZ’s
unilateral reforms. Further, suppose the extent of the liberalisation under CER would have
occurred even in the absence of each country’s unilateral reforms.   Then clearly it reduced
the cost of unilateralism to New Zealand by eliminating tariffs on the only country that
New Zealand might have had any bargaining power over at all.
 A question of some interest from the trade policy perspective is what consequences, if
any, NZs liberalisations have had for its role in multilateral negotiation fora – both the
GATT and regional bodies such as APEC (of which NZ is a vociferous supporter although
Lloyd suggests that this may be from fears of trade diversion should world trade become
                                                                                                                                           
69  Lloyd (1995) p.274.
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dominated by aggressive blocs.70  A priori one would anticipate that it has had very little
effect given that NZ is a small player in these settings.  Furthermore, NZ threw its
insubstantial weight in the GATT negotiations in with the Cairns group of primary
exporters and that may have diluted its voice even further.  As noted earlier, it is possible
that NZ trade negotiators have been assisted by the reforms in that they can take a position
of  “leadership” as a consequence.
 To the extent that NZ has some market power in certain product lines (wool, butter,
some horticultural exports) NZ’s increased efficiency might reduce world prices and thus
increase the costs of protection in other countries.  As in Richardson (1993) and Coates
and Ludema (1996), a unilateral tariff reduction by one country harms import-competing
producers in another and, if their political efforts are the source of protection, this may
reduce protection in other countries as well.
 However, even where NZ is a big exporter, it is unimaginable that these effects could
occur.  In the dairy industry, for example,71 NZ exports 90% of its production but this still
amounts to less than 2% of international output.72  The NZ Dairy Board is a statutory
export monopoly; even so, it is only the 9th largest dairy company in the world.  NZ
exported 151 tonnes of butter to the U.S. in 1994 when U.S. consumption was around half
a million tonnes and NZ butter exports to the EC are less than 4% of European
consumption.
                                                                                                                                           
70  Lloyd (1996, p.18).
71  The following figures are taken from WTO (1996).
72  As a percentage of total trade in dairy products, however, NZ is a more significant participant in world
markets, accounting for approximately 25% of world trade.  The largest exporter is the EU at about 45%.
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 A much more credible mechanism by which NZ reforms could influence the policies
of trading partners is via Lloyd’s “demonstration effect” mentioned earlier.  So the reforms
have given increased weight to the NZ experience internationally: unilateral liberalisation
has led to an increase in exports and removal of assistance to agriculture has led to
increased diversification, rationalisation and productivity in the agrarian sector.
Furthermore, the NZ experience has been highly publicised internationally.73
 New Zealand is also active in seeking bilateral deals. “In fact, New Zealand is willing
to explore fresh bilateral and sub-regional free trade options with any of its significant
trading partners”.74  Of course, given the extent of its unilateral liberalisation any such
deals would impose little further obligation on NZ.
 One further institution we have not yet discussed in any depth is the GATT and its
current incarnation, the WTO.75  As noted, NZ’s reforms have been pursued unilaterally.
Nevertheless, it is a signatory of GATT and an active participant in GATT negotiations
(and has recently taken a case to the WTO regarding a dispute over the EC’s refusal to
allow spreadable butter in NZ’s butter quota.)  But its unilateral liberalisations have
(generally) gone well beyond its obligations under the Uruguay Round agreements.  With
the exception of transport equipment (93%) and textiles (99.9%), 100% of tariff lines are
                                                
73  The Economist magazine in a leader on October 19, 1996, explicitly recognised that the attention paid in
the magazine to NZ, “a tiny country of only 3.5m people [roughly the same size as] Albania or Uruguay” was
disproportionate to its size.  “The answer, quite simply, is that the country merits it.  Over the past decade or
so, New Zealand has embraced more of the free market reforms that this newspaper espouses than any other
industrial country”.
74  Minister for International Trade April 29 1997.
75 Given the explicit commitment of recent NZ governments to freer trade, remarks of the NZ Minister for
Trade Negotiations on the completion of the Uruguay Round which suggested that New Zealand had “gotten
away with something” in not having to make “concessions” beyond those already undertaken unilaterally were
surprising.  While his remarks reflect more his own personal position than that of his government, his
perception that this was needed to sell the agreement politically does suggest a remaining mercantilism in the
electorate.
…
FINAL –  February 1998
Page 43
bound and half of these are duty-free.76  The import-weighted average bound tariff rate in
1996 was 10.8% while the average applied tariff rate was only 5.2%.  Moreover, these





 We have noted the interests that drove trade protection in NZ but what are the interests that
have been best served by NZ’s protection pattern?  To answer this question we have
estimated effective rates of protection across broad sectors of the NZ economy.  It has long
been known that the standard definition of the effective rate of protection – the percentage
change in domestic value added induced by the protective structure – is not meaningful in
general equilibrium (Ethier (1977)): it tells us nothing about the pattern of production,
resource flows or sectoral returns except under very stringent conditions.  Accordingly, we
employ an alternative definition advocated by Anderson (1996) which proposes that
effective protection for industry j is measured by the level of a uniform tariff on all imports
that yields the same return to a specific factor in sector j as does the existing protective
structure.  Its intended interpretation is that it indicates the power of the specific sector to
elicit rents at the expense of society at large, and thus the political power of that sector.
We accept Anderson’s argument that the term “distributional effective protection” (DERP)
may be substituted for “effective protection” (ERP) to best describe his concept.  These
measures are given by
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 where ( )( ) ( ){ } 00j01j w,pw,dp:d d ππ =…
 ti is the ad valorem tariff applied to imports of j,
 pk is the distorted (k=0) or free trade (k=1) output and intermediate input
price vector,
 w0 is the primary input price vector,
 πj(.,.) is the jth industry’s profit function and
 αij is the cost share of intermediate i in industry j.
 Under very special conditions DERP and ERP yield the same  outcomes.77  We report
both measures for the NZ economy in 1990-91.
 To calculate the uniform tariffs that are equivalent to the tariffs that were in place in
New Zealand in 1990 (DERP) we use a computable general equilibrium model, JOANNA,
that is a member of the stable of models that have been constructed by the Research
Project in Economic Planning at Victoria University (see Wells and Easton (1986, pp.182-
237)). JOANNA is a 22-sector model of the Johansen type (Dixon et al (1982)).  Its
variables are expressed and solved for as percentage changes in which form the model is
linear. The version of JOANNA we have used is based upon Statistics New Zealand’s
inter-industry study of 1991.
 The model has profit (utility) maximising producers (consumers) that admit
substitution between labour, capital and intermediate inputs (8 consumption goods) and
                                                                                                                                           
76  Source: NZ APEC individual action plan 1997.  We are grateful to officials at the BIEP group of the
Ministry of Commerce for providing this information.
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the allocation or division of aggregate intermediate goods across industries is determined
by fixed coefficient input-output relationships. It incorporates downward sloping export
demand curves and imperfect substitution between domestically produced goods and their
imported equivalents.  We employ the static short run version of JOANNA and in it
government consumption and total and government investment are exogenously specified.
The short run is taken to be sufficiently long for investment to occur, but without additions
to useable capital stock.  Total investment is allocated across sectors in the manner that
equates expected rates of returns (determined by the current rates of return and the ratio of
desired to current capital stocks in each sector).  The endogenous contemporaneous rates
of return are calculated as the rent to immobile capital – the gross revenue of sector j less
the cost of material inputs and labour.
 JOANNA determines prices relative to a numeraire that is world prices in New
Zealand dollars.  The closure of the model requires exogenously specifying certain
variables and we choose the closure that most closely corresponds to microeconomic trade
models: trade balance and employment are fixed and the nominal wage is endogenous.
 The term “equivalent tariffs” encompasses two tariff measures.  Two are required to
recognise that whereas for those industries that face border protection in the form of tariffs
the statutory tariff rate is the appropriate measure, this is not the case for imports subject to
quotas.  For these, equivalent tariffs were constructed as the difference between the landed
cost of an import and its production cost in New Zealand.  Quotas were of negligible
importance in the period of our analysis.
                                                                                                                                           
77 These are (a) non-joint outputs, (b) distortion of all intermediate goods prices and (c) fixed coefficients
(Anderson op cit p.7).
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 The model was used to calculate the DERP figures of Table 6 and the data of the
model were used to produce that Table’s ERP data.
 (Table 6 here)
 The industry-specific uniform tariffs (DERPs) in Table 6 are obtained from running
the model for each sector.  In running the model for sector j  (j=1, … ,22)  the (otherwise
endogenous) rent of sector j is held constant in the move from the existing tariff structure
to one with a uniform tariff.  The exogenous variables are:
• industry capital-use
• aggregate real investment spending
• real investment in industries min, egw, own, pub
• real government consumption spending
• nominal exchange rate (numeraire)
• trade balance and aggregate labour employed (wages endogenous)
 
 The unreported element in Table 6 (communications) occurs because, starting with a zero
tariff, as the tariff increases the change in the rental price of this sector never falls to zero
over any relevant range of tariff settings.  In consequence, there is no uniform tariff that
preserves the status quo in their rental price: that is, there is no solution to the model that
maintains the same rental price of capital of these industries for this closure.78
 The data of Table 6 pertain to a period that preceded the further reductions in border
protection that we have noted.  Nevertheless, they indicate the broad picture that one
would expect from our preceding discussion.  The CGE model can be closed in various
ways.  Closures that substituted for fixing the trade balance and aggregate employment that
we experimented with included holding constant nominal wages and the trade balance and
fixing real household consumption and aggregate employment.  These two also gave the
                                                
78 Anderson (1996, p.10) notes that when protection is negative a solution may not exist.
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same key picture of Table 6 and, indeed, levels of effective protection (DERP) for textiles
and fabricated metals that were close to those reported in that Table.
 The measures DERP and ERP are quite different.  Apart from identifying the same
two sectors (textiles and fabricated metals) that stood out in the level of protection that they
enjoyed, the DERP and ERP outcomes are not highly correlated measures.79   Anderson
(1996, 24-5) foretold this outcome and provides an example of it.  The lack of correlation
is indicative of the departures of the model from the requirements for an exact
correspondence. In particular, the fixed coefficient requirement may be particularly
stringent given that the tariff tableau is not from exactly the same year as the data of the
model.
 Of the two measures we feel comfortable giving only DERP an explicit interpretation.
It is the uniform tariff that would give the industry the same rent as it enjoys under the
existing structure: it has no immediate welfare connotations.80 The extraordinarily high
DERP for textiles (both relative to other sectors and in absolute terms) fits with our earlier
discussion of the industry and supports the conclusion that it is a sector with
disproportionately great political clout.  The size of this sector is very small, however it is
measured, and hence the aggregate excess rent of textiles is small.  One possibility is that
the sector carries political power because it is labour intensive.  In fact, the data of Table 6
indicate that, on the basis of the labour capital ratio, it ranks the third most labour intensive
                                                
79   So comparing the ranking of sectors by ERP and DERP, for instance, yields a Spearman’s rho statistic of –
0.015, which is insignificantly different from zero i.e. no correlation between the two sets of rankings.
80   Anderson suggests a rationale for the use of DERP by referring to the seminal work of Grossman and
Helpman (1994) in which the rents accruing to a specific factor represent the amount a lobby group is willing
to pay to the tariff-setting authority to obtain protection.  Accordingly, if welfare is monotonically decreasing
in the uniform tariff on all imports then the DERP can be thought of as representing the welfare loss a policy-
maker is willing to incur in order to protect a particular sector.  This story is not watertight, however, as there
is no monotonic mapping from the actual welfare loss of a particular sectoral tariff to the welfare loss of the
DERP.
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industry.  When this is combined with the likelihood that the labour in this sector is
probably less skilled than that of the “Private Services” industry, and that it is likely to
have a much larger proportion of females than the “Building” industry (these being the two
industries that are more labour intensive than textiles), this result buttresses strongly our
earlier conjecture that protection in that sector flows from political responses to areas of
less skilled labour.  The other noticeably high DERP is fabricated metals.  This reflects the
protection of the vehicle assembly industry, but it is interesting that transport equipment
itself comes in only fourth in this list with a rent-maintaining uniform tariff not much
greater than that of four or five other sectors.
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D. Other factors
1. Timing: the foreign exchange and constitutional crisis of 1984
 
 We have already noted that NZ’s reforms of recent years were initiated by the Labour
government of 1984 that took power with a backdrop of a foreign exchange crisis and a
consequent constitutional showdown with the outgoing government.  The importance of
this, which has been discussed at length elsewhere,81 lies in the opportunity for change that
it presented.  That that opportunity was taken so enthusiastically is perhaps surprising but
one of the key elements explaining the success of NZ’s liberalisation emphasised by the
reformers was its comprehensiveness, as we discuss next.
 
2. Trade reform as a subset of general reforms
We have stressed throughout this chapter that NZ’s trade reforms cannot be considered in
isolation from the other reforms that were occurring in the economy at the same time.  One
reason that opponents were overruled is that the reforms were extensive and affected every
sector.  This was quite deliberate on the part of the reformers and was justified not only as
a means of making reforms feasible (in “buying off” groups who suffered from one set of
reforms but gained from others82) but also in gaining credibility for the reforms (by
bringing all NZers into the reform process and thus making reversals more difficult and by
selling each piece of the reform as an essential part of the overall package.83)
                                                
81   See, for example, Bollard (1994).
82  “Large packages [of reforms] provide the flexibility to ensure that losses suffered by any one group are
offset by gains for the same group in another area”: Roger Douglas, quoted in EGWT (1996 p.8).
83   We do not have space here to discuss the broad package of reforms in full detail beyond that we have
already mentioned and what is listed in Table One.  The interested reader is referred to EGWT for a much
more comprehensive discussion of  aspects of  New Zealand’s economic reforms other than in trade.
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To what extent is there any evidence of this quid pro quo in the reform package and
was it perceived differently by the reformers and sectoral interests?84  We have seen in our
discussion of agriculture that farmers very explicitly requested the dismantling of industrial
protection as their price for the removal of assistance to agriculture.  One could argue that
farmers did take a broad view of the reforms, an argument buttressed by their continuing
support even after the initial very dire consequences for agriculture in the early- to mid-
1980s.
The business sector, however, was rather more divided over the reforms.  While the
Business Roundtable was supportive of general reform (and, again, took the broader view
that deregulation was in their overall interests despite the effects of reduced assistance on
particular sectors), the Manufacturers Federation only came to support the reforms
grudgingly when they were already pretty much a fact of economic life.  Nevertheless, the
quid pro quo was again explicit here as evidenced in our earlier quotation from the
Minister of Trade and Industry’s statement to the 1984 Economic Summit that the 20%
devaluation was protection enough.  It has also been suggested85 that the reform of
monetary policy to provide the greater certainty of a low-inflation environment was part of
the benefits put to business interests by the reformers.
As noted earlier, there is also some suggestion that manufacturers did not understand
the ultimate goals of the initial trade liberalisations, thinking that the auctioning of import
                                                
84   Jagdish Bhagwati raised this question and suggests that while a reforming government might see the “big
picture” in which the immediate consequences for a particular sector are offset by other reforms, sectoral
interests might take a more narrow view, focussing on the direct “impact effect” of changes specific to their
sector.
85  We are grateful to Paul Wooding for raising this argument.
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licences was intended to find premia to be used to determine the appropriate tariff to apply
to each industry.  This may also explain their conversion, albeit limited, to the reforms.
It is reasonable to surmise that, along with those of many commentators, farmers’ and
manufacturers’ expectations of the adjustment period and the costs of adjustment were
awry.   That there was a major place for manufacturing in the new environment was largely
unforeseen and it meant that the longer adjustment than many anticipated reinforced
manufacturers’ expectations that they would lose from the reforms. The persistent high
real exchange rate was also not anticipated by farmer lobby groups.  By the realisation of
this, however, key reforms were in place and reforms in the rest of the economy were
being implemented.  Thus there was always the expectation of a fall in interest rates and
the real exchange rate and this expectation affected farmer groups’ positions.  The
expansion of manufacturing exports meant that manufacturers’ initial expectations about
the long-term impact of the reform on them had, in hindsight, been overly pessimistic.  The
reverse was the case for farmers.  We note that there is now a concordance of interest
between farmers and manufacturers, resulting from the dependence of both on exporting,
that has not been present before in NZ’s history.   This adds credibility to the existing low
barriers to entry.
One group that appears to have been “left out” by reformers was organised labour.
Recalling that a Labour government began the reforms, it was always the case that the
interests of labour would be considered heavily but it was argued that the real wage of
workers would be increased through price reductions and price stability stemming from
economic liberalisation.  It was out of consideration for their traditional support base in
organised unions that the Labour government did not move quickly on labour market
reform (something the reformers subsequently regretted) and substantial deregulation did
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not occur until the National government of 1990 brought in the Employment Contracts Act
of 1991.  Also, early in the restructuring of the public service redundancy packages were
significantly more generous than are generally the case under current arrangements and this
affected the position of the influential public service unions.
Returning to trade reform, we argue that unilateralism can only be completely
understood as a piece of the patchwork that made the reforms a coherent whole, as the
reforms were explicitly intertwined, both politically and economically.  One important
aspect of unilateral trade liberalisation for NZ was that it facilitated the light-handed
regulation regime that has characterised NZ competition law since 1986  (EGWT pp.31-
38).  Unilateral reduction of border protection was essential because it was an important
part of the broader programme to allow open entry into NZ markets and therefore make
possible a regime of only light regulation.  The argument here is that open entry and
contestability render heavy-handed competition law regulation unnecessary.  If such access
(to the NZ market) was negotiated on a bilateral basis and so depended on inter-country
negotiations then openness would be rather more limited86 as the provision of preferential
access in a bilateral deal implies that protection against non-members remains.  This would
make a policy of light regulation unsatisfactory as a means of ensuring competitive
outcomes.  Thus, unilateral trade reforms can be viewed as being necessary in providing
credibility for the competition policy reforms: if the former had been negotiated on a
bilateral basis then their necessarily more limited nature – and the possibility of their
reversal – would have rendered the light-regulation regime less effective and so less
                                                
86  One can also argue that, as bilateral deals make liberalisation contingent on the actions of partner countries,
by implication they involve the necessity of reversal if a partner reneges.  So to the extent that such deals are
sustained by the threat of punishment (as in many theoretical analyses of such agreements in supergame
settings), the possibility of reversal of liberalisation occurs.  For New Zealand countervailing threats would not
have been credible in any setting.  In any event, retaliation is not an issue in unilateral reforms, obviously.
…
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believable.  Farmers would have been less sanguine about the removal of their subsidies
had they thought that lower border protection was to be negotiated rather than simply
implemented.
Conclusions
At least two possible political economy perspectives on the reforms might be drawn from
the literature on political support functions and that on competing lobby groups:
First, one might argue that the incoming Labour government of 1984, as a
consequence of its personalities, perhaps, placed different weights on various aspects of
social welfare than did its predecessors; in particular it stressed the welfare of consumers
more highly than earlier producer-captured governments.
Second, one might also argue that the NZ economy had become sufficiently ossified
through the creation of rent-seeking opportunities that such rents were declining through
general economic decline.  Accordingly, pressure groups might have recognised the
desirability of “starting again” rather than simply nullifying each other’s directly
unproductive political lobbying activity with consequent deadweight losses.
Our interpretation of the evidence is that there is some truth in both of these positions.
However, the distinguishing feature of the incoming government in 1984 was less its
difference in goals and more its different perception (however constructed) of the means to
achieve those goals.  The history of trade policy in New Zealand shows a long and abiding
belief in the use of trade policy both as a tool of social policy and as a means of fostering
industrial development and the Labour government of 1984 dissented from both of these
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views.  It perceived instead that these goals could be more effectively pursued in a growing
economy and focused on achieving them indirectly through economic liberalisation.
In this it was aided by sectoral interests that perceived the futility of their mutual
efforts.  As we have noted, farmers’ representatives, in particular, were active in promoting
reform even when the immediate impacts of the reforms were sharply negative for them.
Manufacturers were far more reluctant initially but, ex post, have recognised that their best
interests are served by continued support for economic liberalism.
We conclude by summarising our answers to the questions with which we began.
• What were the vested interests behind New Zealand’s starting point of very high
protection and how did they succeed in getting it implemented?  Crudely,
manufacturers.  They succeeded because of a general sympathy towards economic
arguments that stressed the importance of industrialisation – infant industry
arguments and claims of a declining terms of trade – and because industrial policy
was also used as a tool of social policy, in particular, to protect employment in the
politically-sensitive industries of textiles and auto assembly.
• Why were reforms mooted – what happened such that the early status quo was
no longer politically feasible?  General reforms in 1984, of which trade policy was
a subset, were triggered by twin crises – economic and constitutional – and by a
government with a new policy agenda.  There was also recognition that the existing
pattern of protection and protection-compensation was largely self-defeating but
resulted in substantial resource misallocation and poor marginal incentives.
• Why did the trade reforms succeed (in the sense of being put in place) and how
did that implementation occur so as to overcome these special interests?  They
succeeded in that they were part of a much larger package which, in turn, succeeded
FINAL –  February 1998
Page 55
for a number of reasons: political institutions, speed, scope, even-handedness.  This
last feature was critical in overcoming special interests in that the reforms affected
all parties and could be sold by noting that losses from one reform would be offset
by gains from others.  Exempting certain special interests would have been
politically difficult given this commitment to breadth of coverage.
• Why unilateralism in trade reform?  Partly it was because border policy was just
another interventionist instrument to be liberalised in keeping with the general
reformist philosophy.  Partly it was in the interests of speed.  Partly, however, it was
because of an explicit recognition by policy advisers (i.e. Treasury officials) that NZ
is too small in international markets and policy fora to rely on multilateral
bargaining as an effective means of liberalisation.  Also, we have argued that
unilateralism was important – even essential – in giving credibility to competition
policy reforms by the very fact that the trade reforms were both extensive and not
dependent on international negotiations.
• Why has liberalisation not been complete (especially as it has been so dramatic:
one might think that the final steps would be easier in some sense)?  Because of the
social policy aspect of trade policy in textiles and autos and because of efforts by
recent governments to “distinguish” their reforms from those of previous policy-
makers as driven by practicality, not ideology.
• How important were multilateral and bilateral deals in affecting New Zealand’s
unilateral reforms?   Of limited importance in the sense that NZ was committed to
unilateral reforms anyway and CER was incidental to these.  However, the market
access consequences of CER may have affected the sustainability of the reforms in
contributing towards an increase in manufactured exports and thereby to the
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commitment of manufacturers to the reforms.  Further, the existence and extent of
CER reduced the costs of unilateralism by “removing” the only significant trading
partner country against which NZ had any bargaining power.
• How, if at all, has New Zealand’s multilateral position been affected by these
reforms?  It is our perception that it has been almost totally unaffected.  New
Zealand is still committed to multilateral fora, particularly APEC, and the loss of
“bargaining chips” through unilateral reforms is insignificant, given New Zealand’s
size.  Furthermore, the reforms have enabled New Zealand negotiators to take the
“moral high ground” in bilateral and multilateral negotiations.
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Table 1: a simplified chronology of reforms
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Table 2: Tariff reform schedule 1996-2000
Source: Ministry of Commerce.
Tariff in 1996 Tariff in 2000
Under 15% 5%*
15% to 20% 10%
Over 20% 15%**
* except for motor vehicle components which will only fall to 10%.
** Auto tariffs will be 15% in July 2000 but cut to 0% in December 2000
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Table 3: Exports as % of total sales by value










Large firms 1982 88.2 41.5 12.2 17 16.4 39.9
1994 65.2 53.2 26.6 16.8 18.1 75
Small and
medium firms
1982 19 16.2 5.5 7.3 30.2 11.5
1994 25.4 31.3 5.4 16.7 34.7 22.4
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Table 4: Nominal tariff on new autos
Source: Border, Industry and Environmental Policy group, Ministry of Commerce
1/1/89 1/1/90 1/7/93 1/7/94 1/7/95 1/7/96 1/7/97 1/7/98 1/7/99 1/7/00 1/12/00
45% 35% 32.5% 30% 27.5% 25% 22.5% 20% 17.5% 15% 0%
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1988 50% 21,325 11,875 71,372 49,473
1996 25% 117,025 42,860 65,065 29,727
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Table 6: 1990 Input-output base data: DERP and ERP
Rent Capital Stock Gross Output GDP Employment DERP ERP













Agriculture 1479 4.52 32625 9.55 9081 5.96 4142 5.65 123.5 9.58 0.62 -0.47
Fishing 83 0.25 536 0.16 586 0.38 214 0.29 4.3 0.33 4.68 -3.88
Forestry/Logging 1538 4.70 1308 0.38 2380 1.56 1652 2.25 6.4 0.50 5.51 -0.57
Mining 555 1.69 4737 1.39 1392 0.91 844 1.15 5.5 0.43 -7.16 -0.63
Food/Bev./Tob. 1085 3.31 10918 3.20 12856 8.43 3694 5.04 58.3 4.52 0.76 19.51
Textiles 133 0.41 2363 0.69 2799 1.84 773 1.05 31.6 2.45 36.58 47.15
Wood&Products 349 1.07 2266 0.66 2087 1.37 821 1.12 17.7 1.38 2.47 9.76
Paper 720 2.20 5914 1.73 4635 3.04 1814 2.47 32.5 2.52 3.09 7.46
Chemicals 761 2.33 7516 2.20 4231 2.78 1492 2.04 19.4 1.50 8.02 13.19
Non-metallics 104 0.32 1454 0.43 1180 0.77 356 0.49 7.0 0.54 -2.53 13.78
Basic Metals 167 0.51 4039 1.18 1903 1.25 457 0.62 7.5 0.58 6.81 5.27
Fab. Metals 680 2.08 6055 1.77 7876 5.17 2410 3.29 65.3 5.06 12.18 21.65
Other Manuf. 32 0.10 329 0.10 291 0.19 94 0.13 3.6 0.28 -2.53 35.56
Ele/Wtr/Gas 1471 4.49 29996 8.78 4276 2.81 2027 2.76 12.0 0.93 2.93 -0.50
Buildings 946 2.89 4186 1.23 11976 7.86 3136 4.28 91.5 7.10 3.39 -8.75
Trade & Hotels 3750 11.45 21538 6.31 25796 16.92 10835 14.78 241.9 18.75 2.44 -3.22
Transport 1076 3.29 18597 5.45 7226 4.74 3440 4.69 59.0 4.57 6.95 -2.08
Communications 1009 3.08 6941 2.03 3014 1.98 2233 3.05 33.5 2.60           - -0.67
Finance 5180 15.82 28410 8.32 16910 11.09 10146 13.84 131.7 10.20 0.27 -0.65
Own Dwellings 4312 13.17 90288 26.44 6783 4.45 5048 6.89 0.0 0.00 5.03 -0.63
Private Services 868 2.65 4509 1.32 5706 3.74 2851 3.89 98.1 7.60 5.61 -2.72
Public Services 6447 19.69 56951 16.68 19454 12.76 14820 20.22 239.8 18.59 5.73 -0.60
TOTAL 32746 100.00 341476 100.00 152438 100.00 73298 100.00 1290.2 100.00
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Table 6: 1990 Input-output base data: DERP and ERP
